This is the first of an ongoing series of Philosophy Stories. They will be short excerpts and explanations of topics within contemporary philosophy or important moments in the history of ideas.

In chapter 2 of Minds, Brains and Science, John Searle tells a tale that severely diminishes the plausibility of a theory of mind known as functionalism:

The booth of the clairvoyant Jun was one of the most popular in Beijing. What made Jun stand out was not the accuracy of her observations, but the fact that she was deaf and mute. She would insist on sitting behind a screen and communicating by scribbled notes, passed through a curtain.

Jun was attracting the customers of a rival, Shing, who became convinced that Jun’s deafness and muteness were affectations, designed to make her stand out from a crowd. So one day, he paid her a visit, in order to expose her.

After a few routine questions, Shing started to challenge Jun’s inability to talk. Jun showed no signs of being disturbed by this. Her replies came at the same speed, the handwriting remained the same. In the end, a frustrated Shing tore the curtain down and pushed the barrier aside. And there he saw, not Jun, but a man he would later find out was called John, sitting in front of a computer, typing in the last message he had passed through. Shing screamed at the man to explain himself.

“Don’t hassle me, dude,” replied John. “I don’t understand a word you’re saying. No speak Chinese, comprende?”

In the philosophy of mind, functionalism is the theory that mental states (beliefs, ideas, desires) are constituted solely by their causal relations to other mental states, sensory inputs, and behavioral outputs. Instead of asking what makes a belief a true belief or how a thought originates, a functionalist will say that it only matters the role a thought plays in the total system of other thoughts, feelings, experiences, etc. It’s role is what it is, nothing more. The upside of a functionalist theory is that a system of mental states does not require a biological organ, such as a brain, and can be transferred to a non-biological system such as a computer. To have a mind is to be able to perform the functions of minds.

We may doubt that the person behind the curtain can see the future, is really deaf or mute, but everyone would surely agree that whoever is there understands the Chinese messages that are being passed. Messages are being relayed and meaningful answers are passed back. Therefore, according to functionalism, there is understanding of Chinese going on.

The story of John and Jun says that there isn’t an understanding going on and throws doubt on the theory of functionalism. The question is raises: if its not enough to perform the functions of mind to have a mind, what else does it require? Even further: Does the computer have an understanding of Chinese? How will we ever know if the requirement is that it just acts like it does?